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I.

Maine’s First Industry — Fishing:
An Informal History.

I would like to set the tone of the fishermen’s discontent
with a quotation: “The fishermen of Maine are chronic grum
blers, and not altogether without reason. The terrible scarcity of
bait, particularly annoying when good fishing is reported —
combined with the miserable prices they sometimes obtain for
their fish — is not calculated to make man jubilant or arouse
dormant energies . . . .”
This comment was made in a federal government report in
1887 and could apply today, although I doubt that a govern
ment report of today would phrase the conclusions in such con
cise and unambiguous language. The result of sustained chronic
grumbling is that today unprecedented attention is being ad
dressed at regional, federal and international levels, to the many
problems of jurisdiction and exploitation of the sea. The United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference, the largest and perhaps most
complex international conference ever held, is presently (April,
1976) in session in New York; the U.S. Senate has by unanimous
vote determined that there shall be a United States fisheries
policy; the Congress for several years has had under consideration
the formulation of a National Ocean Policy; and within the last
48 hours, the revolutionary unilateral extension of U.S. fisheries
jurisdiction to 200 miles offshore has become law.
Such intensive attention to the problems of the sea and the
fisheries is unique mainly in degree rather than kind, and in a
sense the various efforts are seeking, once again, the resolution
of long-standing problems.
The fisheries landings of Maine have experienced a steady
decline for 10 years. In 1968 we landed about 220 million
pounds, but in 1975 only about 140 million pounds. This dis
mal record is in itself sufficient cause for grumbling, although of
course the problems of declining catches are compounded by
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numerous other difficulties. It is of some minor consolation, how
ever, to recall that these low landings — 140 million pounds in
1975 — are substantially larger than almost all of the total an
nual Maine landings from 1920 to 1940, and that the all-time
record value of $45 million paid at dockside in 1975 is roughly
10-12 times the annual landed value of the catch in that dismal
20-year period. It may be of some consolation, and perhaps
of some value, to recall that many of the other problems that the
fishing industry now faces are not new. It is therefore certainly
of interest to review the development of Maine’s fisheries.
While other industries on our coast have come and gone,
each contributing in its turn to our economic and, perhaps,
social well-being, fisheries have been with us from the beginning.
The lumber industry, granite, ice, shipbuilding, limestone
quarrying, each in turn have had their thriving periods and
then declined.
Fishing, through it all, has continued, and it certainly shall
continue with any kind of reasonable management. When it
began is unclear, but the archaeologists of Maine tell us that per
haps 4500 years ago offshore swordfishing and the taking of mar
ine mammals may have been the foundation of a population
boom and a cultural flourishing of the indigenous Americans,
perhaps sustained for hundreds of years by some unknown but
favorable aberration in the circulation of the Gulf of Maine.
There is reason to suspect that the Norse in the 11th and
12th centuries took advantage of the abundance of fish, which
could scarcely be overlooked, as they pursued their colonizing
efforts and their timber trades in North America. Perhaps also
the Hanseatic League, in the early- and mid-15th century, based
a part of its prosperity on an international trade in North
American fish. Certainly, or with very little doubt, the fishermen
from the southwest coast of England were sailing regularly to the
Northwest Atlantic to fish, probably earlier than the 1480s.
Fish in those days meant codfish and did so for almost 350
years. When the Cabots “officially” discovered Newfoundland
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and Nova Scotia in the 1490s, the natives told them the land
was called Bacalhao, which is, I believe, a Basque word for cod
fish. Today, still, the fishermen of Newfoundland when they
speak of fish mean codfish.
With the new-found land no longer an open secret but an
official discovery in 1500, the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic
boomed, and then began the struggle over free-fishing versus
limited entry in these rich waters — the same debate that looms
before all fisheries managers today. The English Parliament in
1548 forbade the Admiralty to charge fees for the privilege of
entry or to pursue fishing. But 20 years later, congestion of vessels
and gear in the coastal waters of the new world led to the seizure
and confiscation of non-English fishermen. At least 400 vessels
were fishing off Newfoundland in 1577, and it is noteworthy that
400 years later the somewhat older new world itself advocates the
seizure of foreign fishing vessels in these waters.
Early colonization, particularly by the English, was in large
part stimulated by the need for fisheries stations close to the rich
fishing ground. By 1600 that fishery was supporting 10,000 men
and boys, just part of the fishing effort that was needed to supply
the fish that by law had to be consumed in Europe on 143 days
a year. Humphrey Gilbert in 1583 claimed Newfoundland on
the basis of the Cabots’ voyages, and maintained that his claim
included the right to exclude other nationals from the fishing
grounds.
The French too sought to establish their permanent fishing
bases, and occasionally had them burned to the ground by their
English competitors. Two outposts on Mt. Desert Island were
destroyed by English fishermen, and French fishing crews were
murdered off Massachusetts.
The early 17th century explorers of the Gulf of Maine —
Gosnold, Pring, and Waymouth — unanimously reported that
the cod of our Gulf were far superior in size and quality to those
of Newfoundland or Nova Scotia. It was later found that
winter fishing in the Gulf of Maine, not possible to the north
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east, led to a superior preserved product, commanding a higher
price in the export markets of Europe. Monhegan, Pemaquid,
Popham, Cape Porpoise, Richmond Island, Saco and other Maine
ports were established in this period to ensure drying stations
close to the resource, and Captain John Smith predicted that the
fish of New England would be worth more than all the gold and
silver of Spain.
Sir Fernando Gorges in 1620 received the King’s charter —
the Patent of the Council for New England — which included
a monopoly on the fishing in waters adjacent to the tract —
essentially from Delaware to Acadia. Thus, the decree of Parlia
ment of 1548, 80 years earlier, was overturned (in theory at least)
and free-fishing ceased. An exorbitant license fee in excess of $100
per vessel was established. But it was hardly enforced or en
forceable, and for the next 350 years the right of free-fishing was
not questioned nor interrupted in our waters.
Nevertheless, the debate continued in Parliament in the early
17th century over the issue of free-fishing off Newfoundland, off
New England, and off Virginia, and it was sufficiently acri
monious to contribute in good measure to the dissolution of
Parliament, to the premature death of Charles I by the axe, and
to the exodus of thousands of his former subjects to the new
world. The dispute created a depression in the fisheries of the
colonies, cutting the number of English vessels fishing in the
Northwest Atlantic in half, to less than 150, in the five year
period of the parliamentary debate.
By 1635, fish were an article of colonial coastwise trade as
well as an export item, and the General Court of Massachusetts,
which included Maine of course, established a Fisheries Com
mission to encourage and manage the catch and the trade. As a
result, all vessels in the fisheries were exempted from import
duties and taxes for seven years, and fishermen, in season, were
excused from compulsory military duty. Neither cod nor bass
were to be used for “manuring”, and somewhat later the law
provided for “sworn fish-viewers” to inspect the catch and to in
12

sure quality control by rejecting “ unmarketable, sun-burnt, saltburnt and dry fish.” Closed seasons were established to protect
the spawning of cod, haddock, hake and pollock. More than
320 years later we are again enmeshed in many of these same
issues, and we lack even a rudimentary quality inspection pro
gram.
At that time, the Reverend Francis Higginson wrote that
“The abundance of sea-fish are almost beyond believing, and
sure I should scarce have believed it, except as I had seen it with
my own eyes. I saw great store of whales and grampuses and
such abundances of mackerels that it would astonish one to be
hold . . . and an abundance of lobsters. . . . For my own part I
was soon cloyed of them, they were so great and fat and lus
cious. . . .”
A more recent historian took a different view of the fisheries
and noted that “The prosperous condition of the fisheries along
the entire extent of the New England shore at this time is in
striking and sad contrast to the manner of living and the low
state of the morals of the fishermen, especially along the frontier
coast of Maine.” The king’s commissioners reported in 1667 that
fishermen on the Kennebec, the Sheepscot and the Pemaquid,
“. . . most of them are such as have fled from other places to
avoid justice.”
At the end of the 17th Century, 10,000,000 pounds of fish
worth about $500,000 were going for export to Europe, the Can
ary Islands, and the West Indies. And though the Gulf of Maine
cod commanded, because of its quality, two shillings more per
quintal (or 112 pounds) in the European market, nevertheless
our fishermen suffered badly at the end of the century because
the European market was glutted by French-caught fish from
Acadia. (In 1975, in excess of 1.5-2.0 million pounds of duty
free, subsidized fish came through Maine customs offices each
week from “Acadia” and much of that from the French free ports
of St. Pierre and Miquelon.)
Signs of over fishing off New England in the later years of
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the 17th Century induced our vessels to try the Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland, and finally the Labrador Banks, which brought
them into serious competition with the French. Within 5 years,
665 vessels with 4400 New England fishermen were fishing the
Newfoundland waters and catching 35-40 million pounds an
nually. The mounting competition with the French was aggra
vated by the ill-defined boundary, somewhere in Maine, between
Acadia and New England. The English claimed the border at
the Penobscot River, but the French maintained that the western
limits of Acadia were at the Kennebec. Since the French estab
lished a tax on foreign vessels fishing off Acadia and seized ves
sels not paying, the coastal waters of Maine became part of the
conflict and for 40 years the villages of Maine sustained the bur
den of the conflict. Castine was established in 1696 by the French
to strengthen their claim, and Cape Porpoise was abandoned in
the face of attacks. Fishing in Maine virtually ceased. The
Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 confirmed the French claim to the
fishing grounds of Acadia but left the western boundary illdefined, and in fact left only those fishing grounds east of New
foundland and west of the Kennebec open to the New Eng
landers.
From the New Englanders’ point of view, the solution was
to expel the French and therefore they attacked and captured
Port Royal and Nova Scotia in Queen Anne’s War. The Treaty
of Utrecht in 1713 left the French in Cape Breton wherein they
constructed the fortress Louisburg to protect their interests. The
English government in fact permitted continued French fishing,
saying that “. . . the seas of British America are not to be held
by the British subjects as a monopoly, and to the exclusion of
all other people . . .”, reaffirming the parliamentary position of
170 years before.
The Treaty of 1713 permitted the re-establishment of settle
ments and fishing easterly along the Maine coast, but the rapid
and strong revival of the fisheries inevitably led to new competi
tion. A thousand Maine fishermen with their Massachusetts col
leagues therefore captured Louisburg in 1745, but since the for15

tress was restored to the French, another 20 years of warfare, com
petition, and depression followed.
The costs of the elimination of the French from North
America by 1763 had led to the serious enforcement of the rev
enue-producing Molasses Act and to the new Sugar Act of 1764.
By both measures, which imposed heavy duties on colonial trade,
the English hoped to finance the costs of maintaining their forces
in North America, but, as was pointed out by colonists, at the
cost of jeopardizing the trading structure of their colonies. The
effect on the fishing industry which employed 1000 cod fishing
vessels, 10,000 fishermen and 300 whaling ships could have been
disastrous. In general reaction to the proposal, the colonists
formed associations to boycott the importation of English pro
ducts. In retaliation, Lord North won the support of Parliament
in prohibiting New England vessels from the fisheries off Labra
dor, Newfoundland, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or Nova Scotia or
any other coast of North America outside of New England.
In addition, Lord North’s Act granted bounties to English
and Irish cod and whale fishermen. Once again our fishermen
faced subsidized foreign fishermen. Since at that time the colonies
had debts of about 1 million pounds to English merchants for
imported manufactured goods, and since payment depended
largely on the colonists’ prosperous overseas trade in fish, the Act
should have appeared rather short-sighted. In any case, the Revo
lutionary War commenced about a month after Parliament passed
North’s Act, and for 10 years during the war the deep-sea fish
eries ceased to exist.
“The fisheries and the Mississippi” were the two important
questions in the peace negotiations of 1783. The Americans were
fortunate in retaining liberal fishing rights off British North
America.
It is interesting to note that in negotiating the Treaty of
Paris, the Americans were unexpectedly successful in establish
ing the principle that American fishing on the coasts of British
North America was not a privilege granted by the English after
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the war, but was an inherent right which could only be recog
nized but not created by the British. This principle prevailed
throughout many years of controversy, and as each subsequent
treaty foundered on problems of the fisheries, tariff, trade, or
boundaries, the United States and Britain or Canada fell back
to that principle of an inherent U.S. right to fish in the waters
of British North America.
Ironically, from the Canadian fishermen’s point of view, the
principle even as recently as 10 years ago permitted Rockland
redfish trawlers to fish in Canadian territorial waters from which
certain Canadian vessels were excluded. It will be interesting to
see how this principle fares under Canadian and U.S. 200 mile
jurisdictions. The issue is still the subject of biennial negotia
tions and agreements between the United States and Canada,
which have continuing and current influence on the well-being of
Maine’s sardine industry.
In 1783 Congress was apparently willing to accept the pos
sibility that American fishermen would be excluded from within
“3 leagues” (or about 9 miles) of the coasts of British North
America, the prevailing concept at that time of the proper width
of a territorial sea. Fortunately, the English conceded fishing
rights even more generous than that, in fact right inshore, to the
Americans; but the question of a 3-league or 3-mile territorial
sea kept coming up in years to come, as well as that of the proper
baseline from which to measure the width. Those issues are
presently under discussion by the UN in New York. The U.S.
Congress has recently introduced legislation to determine U.S.
baselines from which to measure our territorial seas.
Thus the fishermen of the United States began their career
within the new nation with their rights firmly established to
continue fishing as before as far as Labrador and beyond. How
ever, 10 years of war had devastated the industry. Vessels and
docks were destroyed or decayed, new men had not been trained,
and in addition the British Council prohibited the landing of
American fishing vessels in the British West Indies, one of our
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principal export markets. Not only was our market thus signifi
cantly restricted, but it encouraged Canadian fishermen to in
crease their competitive activities. The Congress of Confedera
tion, in response to this injury, requested authorization of the
13 states to undertake retaliatory action. Not for the last time in
the history of U.S. fisheries, the states refused such authority to
the federal government.
In 1789 our fish exports were very low and the average fish
ermen’s wage was $93.00 per year. Even so, fearing U.S. com
petition, England and France made efforts to induce American
fishermen to move to those countries. Both gave bounties to fish
ermen and both prohibited the importation of foreign fish.
The plight of the U.S. fisheries was debated early in the
Congress, and the difficulties of the New England industry at
tracted the sympathy of other sections of the country. The rep
resentative of South Carolina declared, “The eastern states had
lost everything but their country and their freedom . . .” and that
“ the people of the South were called upon by every tie of justice,
friendship and humanity, to relieve their distress.”
The second act of Congress, on July 4, 1789, established a
bounty on exported fish which continued, with a six year interrup
tion, until 1854. The subject of further assistance to the fisheries
was reviewed a year or so later by the Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson, who listed as among the problems of the industry
“ . . . import duties of tea, rum, sugar, molasses, hooks, lines and
leaders, duck, cordage and cables, hemp and twine; coarse wool
lens worn by the fishermen,* and the poll tax levied by the State
on their persons . . . .” Jefferson continued, “T o these disadvan
tages, add ineffectual duties on the importation of foreign fish.”
In 1792, the Congress authorized a bounty or grant, paid
annually on a tonnage basis, to vessels in the codfishery, and this
bounty was continued as part of the national policy until 1866.
* From Jefferson’s punctuation, it is not dear whether he worried about the
effect of the coarse woollens on the fishermen who wore them, or merely
about the duty on those fabrics.
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The early rates of the export bounties provided assistance
in the amount of $3.00 per fisherman per year, and the maximum
vessel bounty at that time was $272 annually. In the first 20
years of the vessel bounty, the federal government paid $2.2 mil
lion in bounties, and the industry exported $57 million worth of
fish. The bounties were funded from the duty on salt imported
for curing fish which amounted, in the same period, to nearly
$13 million; thus the government made, from the duty on salt,
nearly $11 million in excess of its vessel bounty expenses.
There were certain interesting requirements to qualify for
vessel bounties. Among them was that of the vessel remaining
in the codfishery for at least 4 months every year, although par
ticipation in other fisheries was permissible. Most interesting were
the requirements that the vessels be examined and certified for
the number and nationality of the crew and for seaworthiness,
and that the skippers maintain and turn in a fishing log report
ing all significant events of each trip. This last requirement is
one that most fisheries managers would like to see now, and it
may be a requirement under the new extended fisheries jurisdic
tion act just signed by the President. It is the basis, in fact, of
any effective fisheries management program. If those ancient logs
should still exist and could be recovered, they would be of in
estimable historic value.
Under such federal encouragement the industry revived
rapidly and by 1808, 1300 schooners from Maine and Massachu
setts, with 10,000 men, were sailing to Labrador and the Gulf of
St. Lawrence; fish taken off Labrador and in the Gulf made up
75% of the U.S. fish exports.
Interest was now increasing in herring and mackerel, and
by 1818 mackerel had become an important factor in the indus
try and the nation’s economy, with much of the total activity
coming from the Maine towns that developed rapidly after the
Revolutionary War.
In fact only at this time did Maine’s fisheries begin to de
velop their full importance. “For too long a period, the fisheries
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of the state were the plundering ground for fishermen of other
places who came only to carry off the treasure of the sea and left
the fishing coast, like a plundered province, poorer because of
its natural wealth.” This observation of conditions 170 years ago,
could apply today to the foreign fleets that have worked within
twelve miles of our coast, or to the out-of-state Menhaden boats
that have taken pogies right inshore in Casco Bay in the last two
or three years.
“By the opening years of the 19th Century, Maine people
began to realize that their commercial and political independ
ence from Massachusetts lay in securing for themselves the
natural wealth of the adjacent waters.”
Whaling was carried on off Gouldsboro in the 1810s, and
more and more towns sent vessels to the Labrador and Gulf
herring, mackerel, and cod fisheries.
The War of 1812 threatened to disrupt once again that
trade, but after negotiations, stalled in 1815 but finally concluded
in 1818, the American rights to fish off British North America
were once again maintained but with some significant restric
tions, and with continuing confrontations with Canadian authori
ties over the interpretations of those fishing rights. Subsequent
efforts in 1854, 1871, and 1888, and 1902 by treaty and negotia
tions to resolve the disputes met with varying degrees of limited
success.
The duties on imported fish which were established by Con
gress in 1818 were removed for Canadian fish in the Reciprocity
Treaty of 1854 in exchange for the U.S. right to fish inshore, that
is, within 3 miles off the coast of British North America, but
were restored on abrogation in 1866, only to be tried once again
in the Treaty of Washington of 1871. Cheap imports increased
9-fold in value, from $571,000 to $4.4 million, from 1842-1855 as
a result of the tariff reductions. By 1830 the United States was no
longer exporting fish in any great amount to Europe, but was in
stead absorbing its increasing catch as well as imports by the
opening of the West. And by the 1850s, Maine was the leading
21

cod fishing state, employing 1300 vessels and 9000 men in the
industry.
Lobstering began as a commercial fishery in Maine in the
1840s, rapidly expanding easterly to Eastport which pioneered
the canning of seafood with a lobster cannery. In the earliest
days, just as there is today, there was a marked seasonal varia
tion in price from a spring high to a low in May or June. In
March, in the 1840s or 50s, a fisherman could expect to receive
three cents each, followed by a 33 % reduction to only two cents
in early summer. In the 1880s, Casco Bay Lobstermen usually
fished between 45 and 60 traps, averaging about one marketable
lobster of about two pounds and three smaller ones of about one
pound per trap. This catch per trap was a substantial reduction
from the 1850s when the average trap catch was six or seven
lobsters of four to six pounds each. Of the total Maine lobster
catch in 1880 of 14 million pounds (worth $268,000), about two
thirds went to canneries. (Approximately the same catch in
1975 is worth nearly 100 times as m uch). So serious was the
reduction of the lobsters considered in the 1880s that there was
a general conference in Boston of the fisheries commissioners of
the various states to establish uniform lobster conservation laws
to preserve the stock. Ninety years later, in 1973-75, the fisheries
commissioners meet again under a state-federal fisheries manage
ment program to establish uniform lobster conservation laws
among the various states to preserve the stock.
Concurrent with the beginning of the lobster fishery was the
discovery in Blue Hill that commercial oil could be extracted
from menhaden which were in great abundance on our coast. In
a short time 100 pogy oil extracting operations were located on
the shores of Frenchmans Bay between Lamoine and Gouldsboro,
and in the 1870s South Bristol had 11 pogy factories valued at
million and employing 500 fishermen. But in 1877 the indus
try failed completely for about 30 years due to a total disappear
ance of menhaden from the coast. At the same time, as an un
expected result of the Franco-German War, the processing of
sardines was perfected at Eastport, and by 1898 there were 61
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sardine canneries producing several million cases of sardines an
nually. The latter quarter of the 19th century saw Maine can
ning just about every fish in the sea, with most small towns sup
porting a lobster, sardine, clam, cod, or mackerel cannery. The
halibut fishery developed in the late 1860s and 1870s, employing
many Maine men on the Grand Banks and as far as Greenland,
and the giant or sea scallop fishery originated in Maine about
1884.
The broadening of the fisheries resources base in this 40year period, which added lobsters, pogies, clams, sardines, scal
lops, and anadromous fish to our industry, coincided with the
relative decline of the cod and mackerel fisheries, particularly on
the Canadian shore. Ironically, as part of the Treaty of Washing
ton in 1871, the United States agreed to compensate the Canadian
government for the privilege of fishing inside the Canadian three
mile limit, and the Halifax Commission determined in 1877 that
the U.S. compensation should be $5.5 million for a ten-year
period. This compensation, protested but paid by the United
States, was determined almost at the same time that the mackerel
fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence failed. The United States
therefore paid, for the privilege of fishing within three miles of
the Canadian shore, 8 times the value of the fishery to U.S. fisher
men, leading not surprisingly to abrogation of the Treaty at the
earliest possible moment. In the meantime, the Canadians used
our $5.5 million to build up the competitive capabilities of their
industry.
The 40-year period following the Civil War also saw the in
troduction of new fishing techniques. For centuries, all fish had
been caught on the banks by fishermen hand-lining from the
decks of small vessels.
The Dutch had invented the long-line or tub-trawl tech
nique, fishing a mile or more of baited hooks on the bottom, in
the 1770s. Not until 80 years later was the technique used by
American fishermen, and then only in the face of protests and
petitions to Congress to prohibit the gear as potentially harm23
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ful. The introduction of long-lining on the offshore banks from
dories rather than from the schooner decks came shortly after the
long-line itself in the 1850s, but in the 1880s, 20 or more years
after the tub-trawl was the common method of fishing on
Georges Bank, some Maine offshore fishermen were still hand
lining from the decks of their schooners.
The purse seine for schooling pelagic fish, particularly mack
erel, was successfully introduced into Maine just after the Civil
War and led to the development of the finest schooners in the
history of sail. The Norwegian gill net was introduced in 1878,
but was viewed with suspicion and not widely used until 1908.
The beam trawl was first tried, without great enthusiasm, in 1891.
The more efficient otter trawl was brought to this country in
1905, and by the early 1920s had practically displaced dory fishing
and schooners.
It is perhaps of significance that, except possibly for the
purse seine, all the new methods of fishing — line trawls, gill nets,
beam trawls, otter trawls — were first developed in Europe, and
taken up in this country only after long delays. Just this week
(April 1976), in fact, two Maine fishermen completed a suc
cessful pioneering season using pelagic pair-trawls for herring.
More than 10 years ago I inspected Spanish pair trawlers in
Newfoundland. It may be of significance that this apparent con
servatism in the adoption of new fishing gear is in part respon
sible for, or at least a symptom of, the serious difficulties of the
offshore New England fishing vessels of the last 10-12 years.
Haddock, that species so favored in the
fished dangerously close to extinction in the
considered a nuisance and nearly trash to
Unlike cod, the haddock salts poorly and it
preservation problem until vessels carried ice
tion and fast-freezing were introduced in the

market that it was
1960s, was for long
offshore fishermen.
presented a serious
and until refrigera
1920s.

The resource base of the fishing industry was further broad
ened at that time and for the same reasons by the development
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of the whiting fishery which recently in Maine has suffered very
hard times indeed due to foreign overfishing. In the early 1930s
the marine bait worm fishery, now worth several million dollars
a year, developed in the mid-coast and eastern Maine areas, and
at the same time the very important ocean perch or redfish indus
try grew rapidly in Maine. Finally, in the winter of 1939 our
northern shrimp fishery began to be significant.
So significant are these diversified fisheries, that Maine ranks
among the top 2 or 3 of the 22 coastal states in the numbers of
species that have a landed value of $1 million or more a year.
This is one of the most encouraging factors, I believe, in our
coastal economy, and there is good reason to believe that this
healthy diversification of important fisheries will continue.
What this rather hasty view of at least 450 years of Maine
fishing history shows, I think, are two or three significant things.
There are very few new fisheries problems, or even fisheries prob
lems unique to our times. Over-fishing, conservation efforts, sub
sidized foreign competition, glutted markets, depressed prices,
quality control, scarcity of bait — a problem that led to many
U.S.-Canadian confrontations — gear conflicts, attempts to ex
clude fishermen from rich fishing grounds, boundary problems,
financial assistance programs, limited entry, excessive duties and
tariffs on essential gear — all these problems cause the fishermen
to grumble today, just as they have in the past. We have gone
to war over some of them in the past. I doubt that we shall do
so again. Some of them may again be addressed with solutions
that have been proposed or tried in the past, with some success
in some cases.
We have seen an apparent conservatism in our use of new
techniques — an interesting phenomenon in sharp contrast to
the innovative European fisheries. By law, however, under the
very new fisheries legislation, the Congress has determined that
as part of the U.S. policy the fisheries shall be carried out as
efficiently as possible. It will be interesting to see how or
whether this requirement will affect our clam, scallop, lobster
27

and oyster fisheries, not notable for their advanced harvesting
techniques. And most interestingly, the review has shown a strong
diversification of the resource base of the fisheries economy. This
will continue with the utilization of new fish and plants from
the sea, and with the growth of aquaculture on our coast.
There is reason to be optimistic about the future. As long
as fish swim in the deep sea there will be problems. But the in
dustry has endured and has survived all the problems in the
past — it is hard to conceive of any possible new problems that
it might have to face — and undoubtedly it shall do so in the
future. At least one of those problems has been solved. Those
coarse woolens worn by fishermen that Thomas Jefferson worried
about are a thing of the past.
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II.

Two Hundred Mile Jurisdiction:
The Salvation of Maine’s Fisheries?

In view of the strong interests and forces arrayed against it,
the enactment into law of extended fisheries jurisdiction, or the
so-called 200 Mile Limit, is a most improbable event, and is with
out question a serious departure from long-standing international
marine law. There is no guarantee that the desired effects — the
rehabilitation of the domestic fishing industry — will result
from the Act.
The concept of the Act is not unique in the long view of
history nor in the perspective of recent years. As an act of
the United States Congress and the President, it gives a major
thrust to the reversal of over 300 years of well-established inter
national law governing the freedom of the seas, a concept upon
which the early fishing and commercial prosperity of the United
States was based.
In the history of the world, freedom of the seas is a relative
ly recent concept. The Romans enforced a 100 mile territorial
sea. Venice claimed the Adriatic as its own. The Danes claimed
the North Sea as far as Iceland. In the early 17th Century, the
English vigorously protested the idea of freedom of the seas. But
motivated by the navigational demands of their rich colonial
empire in the Far East, the Dutch successfully promoted the then
new concept of freedom of the seas. Their legal argument rested
on two principles which at that time seemed to be irrefutable:
first, that property rights in the sea, even if needed, could not be
maintained in any way comparable to property rights on land,
and, second, that property rights in the sea were not needed
because the resources of the sea were inexhaustible — or thought
to be — and therefore the protection, conservation, and enhance
ment of marine resources through property rights were unneces
sary even if possible.
Although at first strongly opposed in the 17th Century, the
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doctrine of freedom of the seas came to be accepted in the 18th
century by most if not all nations, and was formalized and con
firmed with respect to navigation, fishing, air traffic and the lay
ing of submarine cables in Geneva in 1958 by the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The idea of the inexhaustibility of the fish of the sea was
maintained in spite of some evidence to the contrary as late as
the 1890s by Thomas Henry Huxley, among others, who said
“I believe . . . the cod fishery, the herring fishery, the pilchard
fishery, the mackerel fishery and probably all the great sea fisheries
are inexhaustible . . . that nothing we do seriously affects the
number of fish and any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems
consequently from the nature of the case to be useless.”
At that time, the world’s total fisheries landings were in the
range of 2 to 3 million tons annually. In the mid 1950s they had
increased to 30 million tons and 15 years later, by the late 1960s,
they had peaked at about 70 million tons. By the 1950s the
signs of overfishing and the potential exhaustion of deep-sea fish
eries were sufficiently apparent to most nations that the Law of
the Sea Conference in 1958 incorporated (in its Convention on
Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas) the statement that the conservation of the fisheries is
the duty of all nations and, further, that the world’s fisheries
stocks shall be managed for optimum yield to secure a maximum
supply of food. Together with statements concerning some
special rights of coastal states on the adjacent high seas, these
two provisions of the fisheries convention shook rather signifi
cantly the principles underlying the concept of freedom of the
seas. The United States and the number of nations required for
its adoption by the U.N. ratified the Convention, but most of the
major fishing nations did not, and so it is still not binding upon
them.
In the late 1950s, prior to the beginning of the heavy foreign
fishing in the northwest Atlantic, most of traditional fisheries
resources off New England — in the Gulf of Maine, Georges
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Bank, Browns Bank, the Nova Scotia Banks, the Gulf of St.
Lawrence — were shared almost exclusively by Canadian and
American fishermen. Little or no significant European fishing
activity occurred at that time in those waters. The principal off
shore fisheries were then cod, haddock, and ocean perch or redfish. In 1957, the year before the Geneva Conference, the redfish
landings had declined to 48% of those of 1951, the cod catch
was 77% below that of 1945 and 57% less than the average
landings of 1946-1948. While haddock catches were relatively
stable, the overall groundfish landings declined from 1949 to
1957 by something like 200 million pounds, or 40% overall. All
of this occurred prior to any significant increase in fishing by
Europeans or other nationals. But there is no doubt that heavy
foreign fishing in the early 1960s made a poor situation worse.
By 1965, it was clear that as a result of the invasion of foreign
fishermen a major resource crisis was developing in all the fish
eries of the Northwest Atlantic and, indeed, of the Northeast
Atlantic as well. Talk of unilateral extension of jurisdiction over
fisheries, or a 200 mile limit, began to be serious in New Eng
land, even though not seriously received in Washington.
In the same period, a number of other developments were
accelerating. A most important one was the emergence and rising
nationalism of many new nations. Approximately 45 nations at
tended the 1955 U.N. Rome Conference on fisheries resources,
87 nations attended the 1958 Geneva conference, and 158 nations,
more or less, are now (April 1976) in session in New York.
Many if not most of these new nations are of course relatively
undeveloped and are seeking ways to expand their economic
base for the benefit of their people. A surprising number, per
haps 30 or 40, are landlocked nations, having no coastline at all
nor direct door to the sea.
In the 1960s, the expansion of offshore oil drilling ac
celerated, and offshore oil began to contribute significantly to
the world’s fuel supplies. Serious interest was focused on valu
able minerals from the sea, and the technology to mine them was
developed. Worldwide attention was directed to the problem of
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pollution of the seas as supertanker traffic expanded, and the
coastal zones of all countries absorbed larger numbers of con
flicting and competing human activities.
Finally, concurrent with, or as a result of all these de
velopments, the concept of freedom of the seas underwent a
subtle but most significant transformation. It began with the
Dutch 360 years ago as an essentially negative idea, that there
was freedom for all to do as they could on the seas, without con
trol by any nation, because the seas belonged to no one, nor
could the seas be practically controlled by anyone. Nor was
there apparent need to do so. But within the last 25 years, as
the world’s fish landings grew exponentially, and as oil and the
promise of minerals assumed increasing importance, more and
more of the older and the newer nations looked to the seas as a
new economic frontier. Particularly, the underdeveloped and
the landlocked nations speculated on sharing the potential
wealth of the seas. In 1970, by unanimous vote, the General As
sembly of the United Nations approved a Declaration of Prin
ciples concerning the seabed and its resources beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. The Declaration said, in effect, that the
seabed resources, instead of belonging to no one, as was implied
in the original concept of freedom of the seas, belong to everyone
and are in fact “the common heritage of mankind”. The admin
istration and exploitation of this vast heritage thus became a
major source of concern, leading to domestic as well as inter
national dispute and contention, and the issue is now in debate
in New York.
This review of the developing international thinking on the
law of the high seas is necessary to understand why we have the
200 mile act and in the form that it is. That in turn determines
its affect on our fisheries.
Rising national aspirations, conflicts of use, and expanding
resource depletions in the 1960s led not only to agitation in
South America, the United States, Iceland, Norway, and else
where for greater national control over marine resources by uni34

lateral action, but also to increasing realization that the conven
tions adopted in Geneva in 1958 were inadequate to provide
satisfactory resolution of a wide variety of international marine
problems not limited to fisheries. The Third U.N. Law of the
Sea Conference was thus convened in late 1973 and is still in
session in an attempt, once again, to resolve the complex and
interrelated problems. But that complexity and intractibility
are not encouraging for hopes of a successful outcome, and as a
consequence the demand for unilateral action by the U.S. fisheries
culminated in the action signed last week by the President.
The 200 Mile Act is not a simple one in language or in
execution. In many ways it reflects, both subtly and explicitly, a
long history of international maritime law, conflicting United
States domestic fishing and industrial interests, and foreign poli
cies that have been advocated, so far in vain, by the State Depart
ment. It reflects the principles of the International Fisheries
Convention of 1958 and the U.N. Declaration of Principles of
1970, and it reflects a 190-year tradition of Jeffersonian Democ
racy in the management of the nation’s fishery — a tradition
that has not been terribly successful and may now be an ana
chronism, perhaps due to expire rapidly as a result of the Act.
The Act carries the potential for a drastic rearrangement of the
traditional U.S. fishing industry.
When William F. Buckley was a candidate, in his own
fashion, for Mayor of New York several years ago, he was asked
what his first action would be if he won. His reply was “Ask for a
recountl” So may the American fishermen when the 200 mile
Act begins to work a year from now.
The Act does not declare United States ownership of fisher
ies resources out to 200 miles and it does not exclude foreign
fishing vessels from working in those waters. It does not guaran
tee the rejuvenation of the New England fishing fleet. It pro
vides no management authority whatsoever over the valuable
Bluefin Tuna that has been the focus of so much concern in the
Casco Bay area in the last year or so. The Act is unnecessary for
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the protection of the American lobster from foreign fishing ves
sels. It cannot solve some of Maine’s most serious problems in
the groundfish fishery, and it does not establish a 200 mile limit
off the coast of Maine. It does offer the potential of rebuilding,
those Maine fisheries most seriously decimated by foreign fisher
men and it is in fact a necessary first step for that possibility.
It was passed over the strenuous opposition of the State De
partment, the Defense Department, the U.S. oceanographic re
search community, and powerful segments of the nation’s fishing
industry. It was passed in 1975 when it was given practically no
chance of success at all in 1973. It is a most improbable and con
troversial act in our bicentennial year, perhaps primarily in re
sponse to the plight of the New England fishing industry, just as
the second act of the U.S. Congress, on July 4, 1789, was a re
sponse to the plight of the New England fishing industry.
That plight is real. The stocks of haddock, herring, and
yellowtail have been depleted to near the point of commercial
extinction, and some feared to near biological extinction. It is
clear that other resources could go the same way. The economic
impact in New England and in Maine was severe. Total Maine
landings reflect the New England decline. From near 300 million
pounds of annual landings in the early 1960s, Maine fisheries
have dropped almost steadily to about 140 million pounds in
1975. The major part of the decline in Maine, however, is
limited to just three species— herring, redfish, and whiting. While
the landings of other species have decreased in various degrees
in this period, they have not declined as a result of foreign fish
ing and therefore would not appear to benefit from, although
they may certainly be affected by, the 200 mile Act. Those three
species — herring, redfish and whiting — that have suffered
most, and which may benefit most from the new act, composed
about 20% of the dockside value of the total Maine catch in
good years when the landings were more than 200 million
pounds, but only 7 % of the landed value of the catch in 1975.
Thus those species most affected by the Act have even in good
years comprised only a small part of the landed value of the
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Maine industry. The remaining 80-90% of the value of the catch
comes mainly from those valuable inshore species like lobsters,
clams, marine worms, scallops and so on that are safe from
foreign fishermen and subject only to U.S. fishing pressures.
Offshore lobsters, those especially along the edge of the Con
tinental Shelf and therefore at least 200 miles from the Maine
coast, were in 1972 declared Creatures, or Fisheries Resources, of
the Shelf by the Congress under the authority of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf. It is somewhat ironic that
this action, which was taken under the authority of the Law of
the Sea Convention and supported by some U.S. interests in an
attempt to forestall unilateral congressional action on U.S. ex
tended fisheries jurisdiction, passed the Congress as an amend
ment to the U.S.-Brazilian Shrimp Treaty which in effect, if not
officially, recognized the unilateral extension of Brazilian fisheries
jurisdiction to the 200 mile limit, and which indeed even pro-,
vided some American funds to help administer it. Nevertheless,
the amendment attained the desired purpose of protecting the
American lobster, and under that law within recent weeks a
Soviet vessel has been fined in excess of $400,000, and has paid
the fine, for having 60 lobsters illegally in its possession.
The 200 mile law specifically excludes from its jurisdiction
such highly-migratory species as Bluefin Tuna; thus the manage
ment of those species shall remain under such international com
missions as the Interamerican Tropical Tuna Commission and
the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tuna, the body which has determined the policy under which
the recent quotas on Bluefins have been established.
This Congressional decision to leave tunas and other highlymigratory species out of the 200 mile Act conforms to the posi
tion on fisheries which the State Department has presented to
the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, and it serves several inter
national and domestic purposes. The United States tuna fish
ery is one of the most prosperous and efficient fisheries in the
world. It operates on the High Seas and within 200 miles of a
number of Eastern Pacific and South Atlantic countries. As such
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it was desperately opposed to the enactment of the 200 mile Act,
for it feared reciprocatory action by other countries which would
seriously weaken its economic position. Indeed, for over 20
years, the tuna industry has been struggling with exactly that
problem, ever since Chile, Ecuador and Peru in 1952 extended
their jurisdiction to 200 miles, actions not recognized by the
U.S. government.
T o mitigate the intense opposition of the tuna industry to
200 miles, therefore, the Congress omitted tuna and other such
highly-migratory fishes from the control of extended jurisdiction.
By the same measure, it is clear that the Congress hopes to re
duce the chances that its act will precipitate additional unilateral
retaliatory action by those countries with which our tuna industry
operates.
Off the coast of Maine, the Act will establish a fisheries zone
which may perhaps be as much as 90 miles rather than 200 miles
in width, because of course we share the borders of the Gulf of
Maine with Canada. Cape Sable, off Nova Scotia, is somewhat
less than 200 miles east of Cape Elizabeth. By the terms of the
Act the border between the United States and Canada in the
Gulf must be settled on equitable principles by separate negotia
tions. In fact those negotiations have already begun because of
the prospects of oil discoveries on the outer banks of the Gulf
of Maine. The resolution of that boundary dispute will be com
plicated by the fact that three principle but not necessarily com
patible considerations will influence the negotiating postures of
the United States and Canada. The Canadians will argue that
an equidistant line between the two countries, a principle that
Maine has used in its own marine boundary negotiations with
New Hampshire and which is widely accepted internationally, is
the proper determinant of the boundary. But such an equidis
tant line would certainly eliminate from U.S. ownership the most
promising oil-producing areas of Georges Bank, and it would
make no sense with regard to the geography or geology of the
Gulf of Maine. Such a line also would substantially complicate
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the management of fisheries stocks because those stocks apparent
ly do sort themselves out in conformity to the natural geographic
dimensions of the Gulf rather than according to equidistant
lines or arbitrary political divisions.
In presenting its own fisheries proposals to the Law of the
Sea Conference, the State Department has for several reasons
urged the principle of full utilization of fisheries resources in
economic or resource management zones. Among those reasons
is the hope that, if accepted, the principle would increase the
chances that the U.S. tuna fleet and U.S. shrimp fleet could con
tinue to fish in the economic or fisheries zones of other countries
as long as those countries did not themselves have the intent or
capacity to fully harvest the resources. The U.S. proposal would
also insure that no coastal nation could arbitrarily exclude
foreign fishermen and thereby lock up a resource that was not
being fully utilized.
As a consequence of this U.S. position before the Law of the
Sea Conference, the Congress has made the same provision within
the 200 Mile Act. Foreign fishermen shall be permitted to con
tinue to fish within our 200 mile zone and to take those fish that
U.S. fishermen do not have the capacity to harvest but only up
to the yet-to-be determined “optimum sustainable yield”.
The Act thus incorporates as a critical feature of U.S. fisher
ies management policy that rather nebulous concept — “opti
mum yield” — that was adopted in the 1958 Geneva conference
as part of the Fisheries Convention of the Law of the Sea. The
definition of “optimum yield” in the congressional Act provides
for the consideration of any relevant economic, social, and/or
ecological factors. Since the management of fisheries has always
been inextricably entangled in a multitude of usually divergent
economic and social, and, to a lesser degree, ecological factors, it
is difficult to see how an optimum yield is to be determined as an
effective management principle.
The Act conforms to the principle of “full utilization” of
the fisheries by insuring that if the United States, and hopefully
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by implication other coastal states, do not fully use the resource,
then other nations may harvest the surplus up to the pre-determined optimum yield. The Act thus creates a strong incentive
on the part of foreign nations to provide assistance in the re
search efforts that will be required to assess the maximum sus
tainable yield, upon which the optimum sustainable yield shall
be based.
The Act bears in little or negligible degree upon the well
being of Maine’s groundfish industry — cod, hake, pollock,
flounder and so on — as distinct from whiting and redfish. It is
true that the groundfish industry of New England, particularly
that of haddock, has been hard-hit by foreign fleets ■— but prob
ably the Maine fisheries has been more seriously affected by other
external problems.
There now appears to be a relative abundance of these
groundfish available to Maine fishermen within the Gulf of
Maine. This resource is relatively untouched by foreign efforts
offshore. But probably because, until very recently, of depressed
prices, the Maine landings have been low. The depressed prices
have resulted largely from the importation, in vast quantities,
of cheap, duty-free, fish from Canada. This trade amounts to
something in excess of 300 million pounds of fish per year in
New England and, under existing marketing conditions, it tends
to flood the market in which Maine fish must compete and at a
serious disadvantage.
The 200 mile Act will do nothing to change this situation.
This policy of cheap imports from Canada is one that Maine
fisheries have endured for over 100 years, and at present it is
simply part of the national policy — in its ultimate objective
undoubtedly a very good thing —- to minimize barriers to inter
national trade.
We might speculate for a moment on the possibility that the
200 mile Act may in fact increase the flood of imported Canadian
fish into this country and thus make the problem worse. One
interesting part of the difficulty is that the free French ports of
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St. Pierre and Miquelon off Newfoundland land fish of many
nations and re-export an unknown percent to Canada which may
then export it to the United States.
Hypothetically, the reduction of fishing opportunities for
other nations off our shores, and thus a reduction of export op
portunities of that fish to the U.S., could induce those nations to
redirect their fishing efforts elsewhere but to ship a large part of
their catch through the French ports to the U.S. markets.
Another aspect of the problem relates to the simultaneous
and comparable extension of fisheries jurisdiction by Iceland,
and probably by Canada and perhaps by Norway. By those ef
forts presumably those countries each will have larger stocks of
fish to harvest. But each is a major fish-exporting rather than,
like the United States, a fish-consuming nation and in fact they
are the biggest exporters of fish to the United States. With
greater quantities of fish to harvest and to export, it is conceiv
able that they shall make additional efforts, perhaps through sub
sidies and reduced costs, to expand their exports to and shares
of the U.S. market. This would simply swell our volume of im
ports and add to the problems of the U.S. groundfish industry,
particularly in the case of the Canadian fish.
The U.S. Congress in writing this legislation was well aware,
and constantly reminded by the Act’s opponents, of the rela
tively poor record of management of the fisheries by this country.
In particular, it recognized that significant signs of overfishing in
the important stocks of the northwest Atlantic developed long
before the arrival in the early 1960s of the Russians and the other
foreign fleets. Therefore the Congress could not in good faith
exclude or limit foreign fishermen (by unilateral action that was
contrary to the U.S. position on international law) for conserva
tion reasons but not provide for management that would insure
that our own fishermen did not overfish the stocks.
The Act therefore makes rather drastic if perfectly reason
able provisions for a national fisheries management policy —
drastic because very little reason has governed fisheries manage41

ment in the past, and reasonable because, in principle and with
out reference to existing fisheries practices, one cannot argue
with the merits of the provisions. But if tradition and existing
fisheries management practices are considered, then the national
standards have profound, even revolutionary, implications. In
deed, an honest attempt by fisheries managers to adhere to the
national standards shall thrust them head-long into some long
standing and most intractable problems of fisheries management.
Failure to develop management plans adhering to those standards
may then be grounds for the federal government to take over the
responsibility for the resource management and thus end the
long-standing tradition, whether good or bad, of fisheries man
agement in the Jeffersonian tradition at the state or local level.
Among other things, the standards require that management
plans shall be based upon the best scientific evidence available,
that the stocks of fish shall be managed as units throughout their
ranges, that interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as units
or in close coordination, that management practices shall not dis
criminate between residents of different states, and that such prac
tices shall promote efficiency in the utilization of fisheries re
sources. Among the measures authorized to achieve these ends
is that of limited entry into the fisheries, or a restriction on the
number of fishermen who may fish on the resource.
All of these reasonable, authorized, and indeed required,
standards or provisions of the new act have been ignored or
violated on numerous occasions in the past in the management
of U.S. fisheries. Numerous state laws throughout the country
are in fact contrary to the intent of these provisions, and funda
mental social and economic arrangements in a number of fisheries
would be drastically disrupted by the implementation of them.
The Act provides that the management plans shall not apply
within the three mile limit, that is within the states’ territorial
waters, unless, however, a fishery which is carried on outside the
states’ territorial waters also occurs to some extent within those
waters. This will almost certainly apply to Maine’s lobster and
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shrimp fisheries, and in the case of lobsters almost certainly will
force substantial changes in the laws governing the Maine lobster
fishery.
For almost 100 years there have been continuing expressions
of concern over the proper management of lobsters, with regional
meetings at various intervals to establish a conservation regime —
so far without success. The lobster, for over three years, has been
the focus of attention of a rather complicated, federally-funded,
regional management study, and it has been declared by the
federal government a “Conditional Fishery” , meaning that it has
been officially recognized as an over-capitalized and over-fished
resource and it is thereby a prime candidate for attention under
the 200 mile Act.
One of the biennial highlights in Augusta, incidentally, is
the heat and conviction with which Maine’s lobster laws are re
viewed, criticized, and defended. A phenomenon of considerable
interest is the persistence with which those laws are brought up
for renewed discussion.
It is almost as if everyone, in some sado-masochistic way,
enjoyed the exercise without really expecting anything to come
of it. Generally nothing does, but at least it provides some diver
sion of interest during the slack fishing season and can be antici
pated as such with pleasure.
More seriously, there is little doubt that Maine’s $25 million
per year lobster fishery will be affected by the new act, and it
will be of interest to observe how the laws established by Maine’s
Legislature will be reconciled with undoubtedly different regu
lations promulgated under a lobster management plan by a
regional management council.
The passage of the Act implies the hope that it will lead to
the rebuilding of the U.S. fishing fleet, particularly that of the
Northeast, but there is no guarantee that this will happen and
there is some reason to be concerned that it may not. That re
building will take place in the offshore finfish fleet if the poten43

tial investors decide that it makes economic sense to do so and
thereby provide the capability to catch our own fish rather than
to buy and import competitively-priced fish from other countries.
Foreign fish, as we have seen, can be very competitive, in
deed, in our market. Iceland and other countries apparently
have the ability to fly in fresh fish and sell them in the U.S.
market at half the price of the local catch.
Not long after World War II, important New England fish
processors made a decision to get out of the fishing vessel busi
ness and instead to base their activities on cheaper, imported
fish which they would simply process and sell. This decision ac
counts in part for the fact that fish imports into New England
amount to something in excess of 14 times the amount of fresh
fish landings in Boston. It is not clear that those processors
would make a different decision today. If they did, surely the
price of fish in the market would have to increase.
The requirement that interrelated stocks of fish be managed
as a unit or in close coordination is a rather flattering directive
by Congress, because it presumes that the theory and practice of
fisheries management and population ecology are far more ad
vanced in multi-species analysis and prediction than is actually
the case. Unquestionably, the understanding or interrelation
ships between species becomes of major importance under pro
longed and full utilization of living resources, but for some time
to come that requirement will at best be only an incentive, spur
ring ecological research toward the required end, rather than a
realistic management practice.
Aside from its complexities and uncertainties for the fisher
ies, the 200 mile Act has been viewed from two diametricallyopposed points of view with reference to its impact on multi
lateral efforts to achieve an internationally-acceptable Law of the
Sea. The State Department has taken both points of view, al
though not simultaneously! Prior to the growing inevitability
of enactment, the Department deplored and opposed the bill as
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a serious threat to order on the High Seas, jeopardizing the
work of the Law of the Sea Conference and leading to a prolifera
tion of unilateral actions by other nations without the restraints
and policies that were incorporated in the U.S. Act. After it be
came clear that Congress was going to pass the bill, the Depart
ment of State cited the action before Congress as a stimulant to
the international negotiations, showing that the United States
means business in establishing a rational management of re
sources on the High Seas.
We will probably know the truth of either of these views
within a very few months. Hopefully the latter view will pre
vail, because undoubtedly the former would be the fore-runner
of chaos at sea.
In any case the Maine and New England fishing industry
now has what it has long sought. In Maine’s case, the industry
can directly benefit by perhaps 20% of the landed value of the
fisheries, and it may have unforseen and revolutionary impact
on perhaps another 50 % of the fisheries. None of these outcomes,
whether good or unpredictable, is inevitable, however. The
congressional Act merely makes possible some improvement.
Real improvement in most of Maine’s fisheries is very largely up
to the state itself. T o realize that improvement, the state first
will have to appreciate what it has in its fisheries and what it
could have. It shall then have to develop, for the first time, a
conscious and deliberate fisheries policy.
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III.

A Maine Fisheries Policy:
Problems And Potentials

The history of Maine’s fisheries shows that the industry has
endured on a number of occasions in the past almost all the prob
lems it presently faces, and that some of those problems have
been around for a very long time indeed —- in some cases for
hundreds of years. The history also shows some healthy and en
couraging trends — particularly, a continually broadening re
source base — throughout those years.
A reasonably objective analysis of extended fisheries juris
diction, the so-called 200 mile limit, shows that it may, although
without guarantee, provide the base upon which to rehabilitate
certain important segments of the Maine fisheries, but that many
problems and potentials within the industry are not touched at
all by that congressional act.
The Act does, however, establish the beginnings of a national
fisheries policy, and therefore it would seem to make sense for
Maine to examine its own industry to see what it could and
should do to improve the position of the fisheries and to decide
whether anything as formal and potentially influential as a fish
eries policy could be needed and useful. Perhaps it could help
us finally to solve some of the ancient problems.
Part of that decision will rest simply on the value, real and
potential, of the fisheries. The present value is not insignificant,
and there is good reason to believe that the potential value is
substantial.
Although we can identify the landed or dockside value of
Maine’s fisheries at approximately $45 million in 1975, it is not
so easy to estimate the full value of the industry to the state.
The value of the fisheries does not end, of course, once the fisher
men have been paid. All those handling, processing, wholesal
ing and distributing fish, as well as those contributing services

47

and supplies to the harvester and the processor, add to the final
value of the industry within Maine’s economy.
T o the best of my knowledge, no exhaustive or detailed
study of the combined value of all those activities has been made.
Fairly casual estimates, using figures derived from a variety of
sources, have suggested that the Maine fishing industry may be
worth in excess of $200 million annually. If we were to apply to
our fishery a general multiplier recently derived by the Depart
ment of Commerce for the entire U.S. fishery, we would conclude
that our fishery is worth about $315 million annually. A more
restrained estimate would suggest the value at something around
$250 million. Some sources place the value as low as $100 million.
One of the difficulties in estimating the worth of the indus
try is that the state lumps the value of the processing part of our
fisheries in the figures for general manufacturing within the
state rather than within the figures for the fisheries; thus the
value of the fisheries tends to be seriously under-reported or
obscured.
This rather interesting accounting phenomenon is perhaps
a result of the lack of a fisheries policy within the state, and it
is indicative of the need for such a policy. And perhaps also it
contributes substantially to the lack of a fisheries policy. The
landed values as presently reported suggest that the industry is
of rather small size in the state’s economy. Certainly, we have
heard often enough that the industry is sick, dying, or otherwise
in bad shape, and we have heard these statements in spite of the
record landed values, the rising and apparently insatiable de
mands for seafoods, and the fact that we have been steadily
broadening, through the years, the resource base upon which
the industry is founded. These are not symptoms of a dying in
dustry.
Certainly, the industry has problems; it has always had prob
lems and some of them have been with us for several hundred
years. It is well to remember that in fairly recent years our land
ings have been far less, for sustained periods of time, than they
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are at present. Surely the existence of problems is not sufficient
grounds for concluding that the industry is dead, or not worth
some serious attention. The absence of an adequate assessment
of the value of the industry or the potential values of the re
source is no reason to pre-suppose or conclude that they are
negligible. Indeed, this industry has been good to Maine for
longer than any other part of our economy, and there is reason
to believe that it will be so, in significant measure, as long as or
far longer than any other economic activity that we may imagine
at the moment.
Perhaps the fact that it has been with us so long and is so
taken for granted as a normal and accepted way of life on the
coast of Maine explains the lack of a coherent, rational policy.
But the absence of a policy is not in itself a sufficient reason
for developing one. Perhaps the industry suffers not, or negligi
bly, from such apparent indifference or neglect. Perhaps it pre
fers to endure its own problems without the well-intentioned
but possibly fumbling interference that could result from a
formal policy. Certainly there has to be justification for spend
ing the time and trouble over such an effort, and there ought to
be some hope that things will be better for it.
The enactment of the 200-mile extended jurisdiction was
undoubtedly a radical policy action that seriously aggrieved our
nation’s best thinking concerning our national security interests
and our international policy for the development of an orderly
legal regime for the high seas. It perhaps threatened the eco
nomic well-being of the most progressive, prosperous, and effici
ent segments of the nation’s fishing industry — all of this on
behalf of a very small, indeed perhaps negligible, contribu
tion to the economy of the country. If in taking such drastic
and controversial action on behalf of such an unpromising
and apparently insignificant segment of the national econ
omy the Congress and President of the United States found
adequate justification, then surely we in Maine can find sufficient
reason to consider the possibility of a formal and rational state
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policy for the fisheries. Indeed, the congressional action even
stimidates us to do so, for whereas the congressional action makes
possible some new and hopeful developments in the fisheries, it
does not guarantee them. And if we in Maine and the Northeast
who have pleaded so long and so noisily for that action fail now
to follow up on the opportunities that Congress has provided,
then we have failed in its faith and trust and we may have done
a serious disservice to other and vital national interests.
Aside from those opportunities which the Congress has
created, Maine has its own unrealized opportunities, unrelated
to and unaffected by the congressional action, which perhaps
can be stimulated by and developed through a fisheries policy of
our own. Undoubtedly the fisheries of Maine, whatever may be
their total value, have a far more significant place within the
economy of the state, and particularly our coastal region, than do
the fisheries of the nation within the total domestic economy.
Surely, also, the growing demand for and dependence upon
all possible protein sources, including those of the sea, impose
upon us some obligation, if not inclination, to develop as much
as possible our undeniably rich and varied living marine re
sources. Both international and national policies now formally
and explicitly insist, in fact, that this be done through the con
cepts of “full utilization” and “optimum yields” . We must
reckon with the prospect, admittedly somewhat remote at the
moment, that if we in Maine don’t do it, it shall be done for, or
in spite of us. I see no reason why we in Maine can’t, and sub
stantially benefit thereby.
Maine in fact has already formally stated something of a
recognition of the worth of its fisheries. The preamble to the
Oil Conveyance Act created by the Legislature in 1969 says in
effect that the coast of Maine is best used for recreation and for
the harvesting of marine resources. This official although some
what tentative and lukewarm recognition of the worth of the
fishing industry is at least a good foundation from which to build
a formal fisheries policy. Surely such a statement of the best use
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(as the Legislature sees it) of some of the most expensive real
estate in the world, carries weight as a policy position.
The policy would have a number of parts, recognizing the
desirability of a state commitment to the present and future prob
lems of the traditional fisheries and, in addition, a recognition
of an encouragement to the potential of marine farming or aqua
culture. Indeed, such a commitment was made by the Legislature
in 1911, even though that activity remains somewhat contro
versial today. There is clearly room for both; both can make
substantially increased contributions to our coastal economy and
to our protein supplies. Properly developed and administered,
there is little reason to believe that aquaculture would threaten
or displace traditional fishing. It is more likely that the two
types of fisheries activities could be complementary and mutually
supporting.
The problems to be addressed in a fisheries policy are
several. They include resource management, environmental qual
ity, product quality, consumer education, intergovernmental re
lations, the economics of harvesting, and the identification and
development of optimum markets and distribution systems. All
of these concerns would apply to the traditional fisheries and to
aquaculture.
The benefits of the realization of these concerns would be a
predictably sustainable yield sold at significantly higher prices
than are now realized in both existing and presently-undeveloped
markets. The full realization of such a policy could include a
preferential consumer demand for Maine sea products — removed
from the intense, subsidized, international competition that we
presently endure.
There are some immediately obvious benefits to be realized
from the rehabilitation of the ocean perch, herring and whiting
stocks as a result of the congressional policy of extended juris
diction. The combined decrease of these landings in Maine
since 1960 is about 200 million pounds per year. That is to say,
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we were catching 200 million pounds more of whiting, redfish
and herring combined in 1960 than we are now. This decline is
in itself 50 million pounds greater than our total fish landings of
all species in 1975. Restoration of the catches to the level of the
early 1960s, which is certainly feasible, indeed probable, under
proper management, would mean an immediate increase in the
landed value of something in excess of $10 million. The arrival
of any new and exotic industry into the state worth $10 million
would undoubtedly create headlines and jubilation. Since that
figure is a minimum estimate, not including any estimate of the
very considerable processed value of those fish, the state and the
coastal economy indeed have something to look forward to.
There is little doubt that the product would be sold; the pro
cessors’ concern in recent years has been lack of resource, not
lack of markets. This nearly the extent of direct benefit the state
can expect from the congressional action. But we should not con
clude that nothing more can be done.
In the last year or so the landings of cod, flounder, cusk,
hake and pollock have improved substantially. In 1975 we had
our highest landings in each of these species in the last 20 to 25
years — the highest landings since long before the foreign fleets
arrived. The combined increases of these species in one year is in
excess of 3 million pounds — not a great quantity but neverthe
less encouraging — and there is reason to believe the trend will
continue.
This healthy growth, however, is occurring in the face of and
in spite of several strongly adverse factors; namely, first, the flood
of Canadian imports each week approximating in volume the
recent total increase in landings of Maine fin fish and, second,
a combined lack of quality control and identity of Maine product.
The serious flood of free imports of Canadian fish is only a
small part of the national policy to reduce all trade barriers for
the benefit of free world trade. Maine, in spite of the specific
problems it creates in fish and shoes, has a vital interest in that
free trade policy, and there is litttle reason to believe Maine
could change the policy even if it had sufficient reason to do so.
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There do appear, however, to be certain things that Maine
could do to avoid the competitive problems created by that flood
of fish imports. Those things relate to the present distribution
systems of fish. With few exceptions, all fish, whether from
Maine, Canada, Massachusetts, Rhode Island or New York, pass
through just a few principle distribution centers — Boston, New
York or perhaps Baltimore — and in the process the identity or
origin of the fish is lost, either deliberately or from indifference,
and all fish from whatever source are submerged in fierce price
competition, from which the Maine fisherman must inevitably
suffer and usually emerges rather badly scarred. There is little
evidence that the consumer realizes much benefit, either in the
quality of the fish or in its price, as a result of that distribution
system or competition. The price of fish to the consumer remains
high — at times higher than beef — and in too many places the
quality is uncertain.
One can only conclude that this well-established distribution
and trade system does not serve the fisherman nor the consumer
very well. Indeed, it is difficult to see clearly who does bene
fit from it, and in fact it is doubtful that the present arrangement
even deserves the characterization as a “system” .
I should emphasize at this point that I am not speaking of
the trade in shellfish or processed fish such as ocean perch or
herring, but only of Maine’s trade in fresh fin fish — cod, hake,
pollock, flounder and so on. While we may expect that our fin
fish landings will continue to rise as they have in recent years, the
Maine fisherman will not realize the optimum, as distinct from
marginal, benefits from this harvest until several things are done
to improve his market position.
In the first place, Maine could create a strong and favorable
image in the mind of the consumer for Maine fish of all kinds.
We already have an excellent base to build upon in the repu
tation of Maine lobster. Indeed “ Maine” lobster, advertised
as such, is sold in restaurants throughout the country regardless
of whether the actual supplier is Maine, Massachusetts, Nova
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Scotia or Newfoundland. The same waters, the same environ
ment, and the same fishermen that produce Maine lobster also
produce scallops, cod, clams, and hake. Indeed, in the year 1610
the superior cod from the Gulf of Maine was commanding a
higher price in the European markets than was cod from Nova
Scotia or Newfoundland, and Gulf of Maine fish kept that com
petitive advantage for over 100 years. Maine, therefore, should
take advantage of the well known Maine mystique and of the
high reputation that its lobster already has, and identify its fish
to insure that its other sea products benefit from, and of course
sustain, that reputation.
The problem of quality control is an integral part of the
problem of product identification. There is presently no general
inspection system for quality control of fin fish, particularly of
fresh fish. We as a nation have seen fit to insist on inspection of
meats but not of fish. It. is reasonable to expect that a national
fish inspection program is inevitable, and there is little doubt
that consumer confidence in fish quality will be improved with
such a system and that fish sales will increase as a result of that
confidence.
It would seem to make sense therefore for Maine, as a mat
ter of policy, to establish its own fisheries inspection and quality
control program, and to publicize that program nationwide. A
first-in-the-nation program of this kind should give Maine fish a
unique competitive advantage, in addition to the advantage
that the reputation of Maine lobster could create.
If these efforts in product identification and quality control
are to be effective in benefiting the Maine industry, however,
Maine fish must in fact maintain their identity in the market;
they must avoid the crushing competition of fish floods from the
other resources and the resulting anonymity of our product. This
calls for the development of neglected or under-exploited mar
kets and for a new and a real distribution system. There is good
reason to believe that there are undeveloped fish markets within
reach of the Maine fishermen. Even though the United States
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is the largest importer of fish in the world, we have one of the
lowest per capita rates of fish consumption. The domestic mar
ket appears to have much room for expansion. The entire North
east, say the area from Portland west and north to Buffalo to
Montreal to Toronto, appears to have large market potential and
yet is poorly served by the existing distribution patterns. By seri
ously exploring this large area Maine undoubtedly could identi
fy more than ample markets for its fish. Such markets would
not compete with the existing distribution of fish — because the
present trade routes do not serve those areas in any significant
way. This new territory could take Maine fish out of its disad
vantaged competition with imported fish and it would permit the
retention of the identity of the Maine origin of the product. This
in turn would make most effective a unique Maine inspection
and quality control program.
The question of costs in identifying, establishing and con
trolling such a new distribution system should give ample exer
cise to those economists and experts in logistics who may take an
interest in the problem. Can we afford such efforts? There is
undoubtedly a wide spread between price at the dock and cost to
the consumer. Last fall when the fishermen in Stonington were
getting 2c a pound for excellent hake and pollock, the price in
Augusta was running to $1.19. While the price of Maine flounder
in 1975 averaged 25c per pound at the dock, filets were selling
in Boston at an average of $3.69 a pound.
Allowing for the costs of boxes, ice, processing and trans
portation, these price differentials between producer and con
sumer would seem to offer reasonable room for absorbing the
costs of inspection and more efficient distributions within a new
market area.
The Maine industry at this time cannot afford in time or
costs this kind of market, distribution, and cost analysis. There
fore this area, with such potential benefits to the state’s economy,
would appear to be a legitimate interest of the state, and could
be a most important, indeed perhaps the most important, area
of activity by the state as part of a fisheries policy.
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I would like to repeat and emphasize that there is no ap
parent reason why the development of such new markets should
interfere with or compete with existing fin fish distribution
trades. Indeed there is little to find in such new markets except
benefit to all concerned.
Fishermen at the moment are enjoying good prices for some
of their fish, but the quantities, although increasing, are limited
and are likely to remain so in the near future. Their income,
then, will remain a fine line between revenues and costs. And
costs to the fishermen, like all of us, have risen exponentially.
In view of relatively limited catches to be expected for some years
to come, there is good reason to examine carefully every possible
way of reducing fishermen’s overhead. Undoubtedly the average
Maine dragger is an expensive, perhaps too expensive, means of
catching the volume of fish that can reasonably be expected. The
costs of net material, steel cables, heavy winches, electronics,
powerful engines, insurance, and fuel itself are very high and
we cannot reasonably expect them to come down. They are all
essential to the dragger method of fishing, which was most appro
priate for an earlier day of fish abundance. New, perhaps simpler,
methods of fishing — taking advantage of the good prices but
recognizing the relatively, small volumes to be expected — may
permit a reduction in overhead costs, and therefore a reasonable
and more encouraging margin of return.
Better or newer methods of fishing have always come late
and reluctantly into the New England fishery. The fishermen’s
usually conservative view of their hostile world has not generally
encouraged new approaches, probably because the costs of failures
of innovation have been prohibitive. But the state has a funda
mental interest in promoting prosperous and efficient fisheries
and it would do well to work with the industry in developing
less-costly harvesting methods. There is already awareness of
this problem within the fisheries, and some interest in the pos
sibilities of less expensive methods.
The recent increase in gill-netting from smaller vessels, with
a significant contribution of those vessels to the increased ground57

fish landings, is a good example of the interest in less-costly fish
ing methods.
The industry and the state ought to make a serious commit
ment to better resource management of several kinds. The un
necessary annual losses due to mortality in our lobster pounds,
for example, are too high — perhaps up to $1 million per year.
The measures necessary to prevent this waste are well known but
only partially observed.
The landed value of the existing lobster catch could be in
creased by about 18% even without special management efforts
to increase the absolute size of the lobster population. That one
improvement in managing the landings would have amounted
to about $4.5 million in 1975.
Over the years Maine has developed a respectable capability
of predicting the normal fluctuations in abundance of its highvalue marine species. The state has regularly made those pre
dictions that are possible with a good record of accuracy. Gener
ally speaking, however, the industry has ignored the predictions,
with resulting unnecessary costs that must cumulatively total in
the millions of dollars. Why this should be so is not clear. Ob
viously the work of the biologists does not hold the respect it
should, but in view of the generally good record of prediction
and management recommendations by the scientists, the industry
would do well to listen carefully to what the scientists have to
offer. A policy of fisheries education, beginning in the elemen
tary schools in coastal towns, could do much to correct this prob
lem and provide for an understanding of what research and
management has done and can and cannot do for the industry.
At the same time, the legislature can insure that fisheries re
search and management efforts are properly administered and
adequately funded, and that there is appropriate implementation
of management recommendations.
At the moment, state funds for fisheries research efforts in
Maine amount to less than 1 % of the landed value of the catch.
In fact all state expenditures in research, enforcement, rnanage58

ment, gear development, marketing, shellfish inspection, public
health monitoring and exploratory fishing amount to perhaps
5% of the landed value, or undoubtedly less than 2% of the
manufactured value of the industry.
Implementation of management recommendations by the
Legislature will require faith in the ability of the biologists as
well as recognition that their efforts can only be approximations;
but even though approximate, sufficiently reliable to provide
significant assistance to the industry and to justify reasonable
state expenditures.
Perhaps as difficult, or even more so, will be the development
of a new modus vivendi between all the state legislatures, which
until now have exercised almost exclusive fisheries management
authority in this country, with the new, untried, unproven and
potentially unwieldy Regional Management Councils established
by the Congress. They must operate under the directive of produc
ing of an optimum yield and under the close scrutiny of the fed
eral government. What shall a state delegate to a Regional Man
agement Council do when presented with a management pro
posal that is at odds with his state law and when failure to take
appropriate action invites the preemption of the Regional Coun
cil Authority or of state control by the Secretary of Commerce?
How shall the Legislature, faced with the same options, react to
the new federal standards that in many cases are clearly at odds
with state practices or policies that have been evolved over the
years — practices now enforced or protected by law and which
are the foundation of rather pervasive and well-established eco
nomic arrangements. It is clear that, to adequately define and
maintain whatever fisheries practices it may desire, a state is
going to have to clearly recognize the place of fisheries within its
economic and social arrangements and then develop and articu
late clearly, logically, and persuasively the reasons for those prac
tices. In no other way, it seems to me, can a significant number
of existing fisheries practices be defended and maintained in the
face of the federal standards.
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A formal statement of a fisheries development and manage
ment policy should enable the state to maintain its own legiti
mate interests in the fisheries even though those interests may be
at odds with regional or federal views. Such points of divergence,
for example, could include the relative emphasis on commercial
versus recreational fishing — two different resource uses that may
call for quite different management practices. Other possible
differences may include kinds of gear used, or the economic ob
jectives that the state has in mind for the uses of its fisheries
resources.
It is very probable that at this time Maine is not obtaining
the full worth of its fisheries as a result of value added to the
product in the processing of the resource. The first step in this
direction is, of course, to isolate and clearly identify the present
processed or manufactured value of the fisheries rather than, as
is presently done, merge that economic worth within the category
of general manufacturing within the state. If this exercise should
confirm that the total value of the industry is presently about
$100 million, implying a multiplier of 2 over landed value, and
if the federal government is correct in its estimate of a multiplier
of 7 for the nation’s fisheries as a whole, then clearly Maine has
a lot of room for improvement in strengthening its fish processing
revenues. European countries have developed, quite profitably,
rather sophisticated processed fish products of various kinds for
a wide variety of species. Surely it is in Maine’s interests to ex
plore these possibilities and to encourage our interest in the same
direction.
In a related area, there is good reason to believe that we can
bring additional species into significant production. The history
of Maine’s fisheries shows a very healthy trend in the continued
broadening of the resource base, with new species being de
veloped and maintained each in turn (admittedly with substantial
fluctuations from time to time) as important components of
our industry. Of all the 22 coastal states, Maine is one of the top
three or so in the numbers of species each with a landed value of
$1 million or more per year.
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There is currently interest and activity in this area. The
further development of new species will require identification of
market potentials (here, further development of Bangor In
ternational Airport would be of great help) , exploratory fishing,
gear development, resource management practices, instruction
in processing and handling techniques, and education of fisher
men in the potential of the resource.
There will inevitably be difficulties and problems in exploita
tion of newTresources just as there have been in the past. But a
well-planned, deliberate, and sustained effort, with close collabora
tion between the state and the industry — which has never hap
pened in the past! — can do much to smooth the way.
New species development has several potential benefits in
addition to the obvious one of broadening and strengthening the
state’s economic base. It can relieve excessive fishing pressure on
the relative small number of species that presently attract most
fishermen. It can provide alternate species to take up the slack
when the traditional species go through their normal and pre
dictable, but probably uncontrollable, fluctuations in abundance.
It can strengthen the market or consumer interest in the Maine
fishing industries as a whole. Experience in trade shows clearly
proves that serving unusual species such as dogfish, skatewings,
monkfish, — all excellent seafoods — stimulates curiosity about
what else Maine has to offer. The feeling seems to be that the
less-familiar offerings of the state that produces the lobster can’t
be all bad! Lobster itself must at one time have been viewed
with as much suspicion as sea urchins are today. Indeed, for some
people in the 1840s, lobster wras valued as pollock bait somewhat
more than it was for human food.
It is rather ironic that in considering processed value and
the development of new species, Maine has one of the largest sea
weed processing plants in the world in Rockland, importing great
quantities of seaweeds from all over the world and greatly add
ing to its value. But Maine is producing negligible quantities of
the raw materials and doing nothing at all to improve that situa
tion.
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One of the essential requirements for a fully-developed fish
ing industry must be greatly improved water quality and pollu
tion control. The traditional fishery in the past has lost large
production and value as a result of public health problems, loss
of spawning grounds, and undoubtedly other conditions associ
ated with a variety of pollution problems. We have in Maine
experienced various degrees of almost all kinds of pollution and
malpractice problems in the sea — bacterial, oil, heavy metals,
heat, insecticides, lumber mill wastes, breakwater and highway
construction, and so on. There is clearly improvement in some
areas, and room for improvement in others.
In addition to the loss of production in traditional fishing,
these problems present a clear threat to the potential of aqua
culture on our coast. No entrepreneur could reasonably afford the
investment of money, time, and effort in an important aquacul
ture activity with the possibility of pollution or water quality
alteration before him. Nor can either branch of the fisheries —
traditional or cultivated — risk the loss of consumer confidence
in the quality of the product as a result of real or potential
pollutants.
Guarantees of water quality must be part of a state fisheries
policy, and such guarantees make economic sense in view of the
developmental potential of the coast.
A fisheries policy could have broad and beneficial planning
implications for Maine. One of the most persistent and emotion
al questions in Maine for at least a decade has been — what are we
going to do with our coast? This debate has involved almost
everyone within the state and a good many beyond. The legisla
ture has spoken, although tentatively and infrequently on the
issue, and the debate has influenced gubernatorial elections. There
is a Coastal Planning Unit within the State Planning Office of
the Executive Department, and Maine receives federal funds
under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. There has
been a special coastal task force appointed by the Governor and
there is now a Governor's Coastal Conservation and Development
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Committee. And still the question of what are we to do with our
coast flourishes and persists amidst a superabundance of pro
posals, economic and emotional concerns, and potentially con
flicting uses. There is no doubt that the conflict of use is bound
to increase, not just in Maine, and that some reasonable resolu
tion of those conflicts must be attained.
When one has the opportunity for the proposal of public
policy, as I do this evening, then one has the opportunity to ex
pose his personal prejudices and interests, which I do not hesitate
to do since such opportunities are not that frequent nor usually
as favorable as this occasion.
One of the great difficulties, it seems to me, with whatever
plans that are being developed or proposed for the Maine coast
is that they do not have objectives that are clear and understand
able to all.
In fact there is reason to suspect that some of the planning
may not have any real objectives at all. I find it very difficult to
think about plans that lack objectives, and I do not understand
how they can work. In the hope, therefore, of offering a con
structive suggestion and a reasonable and understandable plan
ning goal that can accommodate a variety of legitimate economic,
traditional, emotional, and aesthetic interests on the Maine coast,
I would simply propose that the primary objective or activity of
the coast be a maximum production of sea products. I do not
propose that this be the exclusive goal or use of the coast, but
simply that we decide that it shall be that activity in which we
are most interested and that all other activities be encouraged,
tolerated, discouraged or prohibited to the degree that they
would bear upon or influence that primary purpose. The merit
of the proposal, it seems to me, is that it is understandable and
that it provides for sufficient quantification of the options to
permit reasonably objective decisions among them. It sets a
quantifiable, understandable and reasonable standard for develop
ment.
Fishing in all its forms has been here in Maine from the
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beginning — which was a very long time ago. It has been and
could be a very significant economic activity on our coast. Its
well-being depends upon maintenance of high water quality. It
is an industry that is completely compatible with the traditions
and inclinations of Maine people, and in which Maine people
excel. It is an economic activity in which we can establish
unique capabilities and unique resources, and in which we do not
necessarily have to compete disadvantageously — “at the end of
the road”. It is an industry that for over a hundred years has
provided a uniquely attractive quality to Maine life that is
favorably known throughout the country. It is an industry that
provides the best kind of protein — a commodity in increasingly
short supply and increasingly high demand throughout the world.
It is an industry that inevitably must have greater relevance to
the most serious problem of the human condition — that of ade
quate nutrition.
It is an industry that makes sense for Maine and that has
great potential for Maine. It has a future even if we continue
to neglect, underrate, or abuse it. It has a great future if we
recognize that in the fisheries we have something special, and act
accordingly.
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